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This paper aims to assess critically the debate on the "learning of the past tenses of English verbs"
between those symbolists who are proponents of symbol manipulation model of the language and those
connectionists who are proponents ofparallel distributed processing model of it, thereby suggesting that
between such extreme positions there is still a realistic position that linguists can take to blur the
debate. It is when linguistics is conceived as a phmomenology ofthe language, as much as chemistry,
for example, is a phenomenology of the nature. If the position is adopted, theoretical constructs such
as "rules," "schemes," "patterns," can be defended only for a negative reason: without them we could
not describe linguistic phenomena correctly and effectively enough to draw any scientifically significant
generalizations. To take this position is to take a perspective from which rules are no more than a
heuristic device. This is, I claim, the most realistic position in which scientific identification of
linguistics, or linguists' looser talks about the language, can be maintained.
1. What is the Symbolist-Connectionist Debate, and Why?
The debate that I want to critically assess below emerged when Rumelhart and McClelland
(1986, p. 267) claimed as follows:
(1) ..• We have, we believe, provided a distinct alternative to the view that children learn the
rules of English past-tense formation in any explicit sense. We have shown that a
reasonable account of the acquisition of past tense can be provided without recourse to
the notion of a "rule" as anything more than a description of the language. We have
shown that, for this case, there is no inductioll problem. The child need not figure out
what the rules are, nor even that there are rules.
What they attack here is obviously the celel:rated paradigm of symbol manipulatioll that was
introduced by Noam Chomsky (1957, 1975) in linguistics under the title of "generative grammar,"
providing a "revolution" in that field,l and thee came into fashion in some other branches of
psychology such as "cognitive science" (Fodor, Ig83; Phylyshyn, 1984), and "artificial intelligence"
(Newell and Simon, 1972) as well. The symbol manipulation paradigm, or simply symbolist paradigm,
has long been cherished since, probably because it embodied one methodological assumption on the
nature of human mind: mental behaviors of human being can be described and explained by the
'For ule notion of "(scientific) revolution," see Kuhn (l970)' And for detailed information of the revolution, see, for
e.xample, Newmeyer (1986), Harris (1991).
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system of explicitly specified rules.
With the advent of "parallel distributed processing" (PDP) paradigm, however, the hegemony of
the symbolist paradigm began to lose, for radical proponents of the PDP paradigm, or connectionists,
so to be put, began to challenge symbolists' crucial methodological assumption mentioned just above.
It should be noted, to be fair, that connectionism is an approach of a different tradition, which
originates in McCulloch and Pitts (1943) style of the brain science, and most of the claims that
connectionists explicitly made are relevant to linguistics basically in indirect ways. Some claims,
however, really reach across the borders between fields to linguistics. One of them is the empirical
status of what we have referred to as rules. Rumelhart and McClelland (op. cit.), for example,
showed, I believe, that, without any implementation of so-called past tense formation rules such as
"change internal vowel -i- to -0-," PDP models which make use of "pattern association" between two
internal states on prepared neural network can simulate the English speaker's peiformance of past
tense formation, even the aCfJuisition of that formation. They thereby posed a question of what it is
that human mental behaviors can be described in terms of rule, and claimed against symbolist, as can
be seen in (I), that rules may describe mental behaviors such as past tense formation, but never explain
them.2
Symbolists such as Fodor and Phylyshyn (1988), Pinker and Prince (X988), Lachter and Bever
(x988) soon accepted this Rume1hart and McClelland's challenge, trying to undermine theoretical
thrusts of the PDP model. It is not my own interest in this paper, though, to assess all of those
counter-criticisms, for I believe they are virtually the same: they singly insist that rules can be
explanation. So, I will take the counter arguments by Pinker and Prince (op. cit.) for instance, which
I think is the most detailed and sophisticated, and try to assess its defensive power. I will address §2
to the examination of Pinker and Prince's objection to the claim explicit in (x), and reveal an
ideological character of the debate, concluding that their defense is not successful on the ground that
Pinker and Prince only act as if there were no burden of proof on symbolists' part. In §3, for the
purpose of making more clear what is crucial in the debate, I will examine an extended portion of
English verb inflection in as theory-neutral a way as possible, ultimately proposing that the symbolist-
connectionist debate can be managed properly only if one understands what is an explanation on
phenomenological scales. In §4. I will provide additional arguments for the direction of solution that
I suggest.
2. Ontological Commitment to URules" of Language
2.1 Pinker and Prince's Counter-attacks on the PDP Model
Pinker and Prince (x988, pp. 8x-82) enumerate the follo\ving twelve points arguing against the
claim in (x):
(2) a. Rume1hart and McClelland's actual explanation of children's stages of regularization of
the past tense morpheme is demonstrably incorrect.
b. Their explanation for one striking type of childhood speech error is also incorrect.
c. Their other apparent successes in accounting for developmental phenomena either have
nothing to do with the model's parallel distributed processing architecture, and can easily
2For connectionists' specific models and claims, see Rumelhart, et al. (1986). McClelland, el al (1986), and Davis, ed.
(1992). For their goals and related philosophical issues, see Clark (1990). The approach called here connectionism is also
dubbed aJSocialionism for its theoretical relevance to the theory of associative memory, which was founded by Qyillian
(1967), and developed notably by Kohonen (1977).
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be duplicated by symbolic models, or involve major confounds and hence do not provide
clear support for the model.
d. The model is incapable of representing certain kinds ofwords.
e. It is incapable ofexplaining patterns of psychological similarity among words.
f. It easily models many kinds of rules that are not found in any human language.
g. It fails to capture central generalizations about English sound patterns.
h. It makes false predictions about derivational morphology, compounding, and novel
words.
I. It cannot handle the elementary problem of homophony.
)- It makes errors in computing the past tense forms of a large percentage of the words it is
tested on.
k. It fails to generate any past tense form at all for certain words.
1. It makes incorrect predictions about the reality of the distinction between regular rules
and exceptions in children and in languages.
Pinker and Prince's objection, however careful in pointing out deficiencies of the alleged model,
seems to me just a red herring: since it is not difficult to see that they have at best succeeded in their
arguments in sho1.ving that the alleged model is not yetperfect.
There is no model that has any limitations, but some limitations can be ameliorated with
appropriate modifications. Note that those deficiencies enumerated in (2), which of course may not
be exhaustive. divide into the three categories: I) deficiencies which validate the PDP model's current
imperfectness (i.e., d, f, i, j, k); II) that which is almost irrelevant to the issue (i.e., f), J and m) those
which validate the PDP model's incorrectness only with certain premises (i.e., a. b, c, e, g, h, 1).
Putting aside irrelevant ones, all within the category 1 are factual, but all that fall within mare
theoretical; since each deficiency of the category III is incorrect as far as it is either explanation. or
generalization, or prediction, and all of the deficiencies that may not be modifiable are all of the
category m.
It should be also noted, however, that Pinker and Prince reject only eliminative one of the
following three kinds of connectionism: (i) implemmtational connectionism that explores such PDP
models that 'they would characterize the elementary information process provided by neural networks
that serves as the building blocks or rules or algorithms' (Pinker and Prince, op. cit., pp. 77-78); (ii)
eliminative connectionism that explores such PDP models that 'they are will replace symbol-processing
models as explanations ofcognitive process' (ibid.); and (iii) revisionist connectionism is the intermediate
between (i) and (ii) , and seek a 'PDP theory [that] could lead to fundamental new discoveries about
the character of symbol-processing, rather than implying that there was no such thing.' (ibid.)
To sum up, any PDP model may be rejected by symbolists only if such eliminative claims as in (1)
accompany with it. Thus, Pinker and Prince's objection is indirect in that it is not directed to
Rumelhart and McClelland's conclusion like (I) as one of the implications of their model. Hence,
the debate is rather ideological than empirical.
2.2 What Symbolists Fight for and Connectionists Fight against
The structure of the debate can be simplified like this: Given an open question of why the
speaker of English utters kicked, for example, as the past form of the verb kick. Symbolists, on the
one hand, postulate that the question can be answered like this: (1) it is because there is such a rule as
lThis is irrelevant because it is not emprically clear how much human beings learn at all.
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"add -ed to the base kick," which, accidentally, results in such a pair. Connectionists, on the other
hand, postulate that the same question can be answered like this: (2) it is because there occurs a
pattern association in the brain such that it can be accidentally described by the rule of"adding -ed to
the base." Thus, the debate looks like a vicious circle of whether the rule or the performance is the
first.
The problem may be enigmatic, since it seems to constitute a vicious circle, but let us pose here
another question: Which is more explanatory? The "explanation" in the symbolist paradigm crucially
relies on a theoretical construct called "rule," and that in the connectionist paradigm on another
construct called "association." Note that an explanation is a relationship of two things: something
that is to be explained (call this explanandum) and something that is to explain (call this explanatum).
The phenomenon of past tense formation is their common cxplanandum; but there are two ways of
explanation because it is characterized by means of different explanata, rule and association in
symbolist and connectionist paradigms respectively. Although there is no single measure to compare
two different explanations, I want to single out one measure here. Granted one explanation is more
explanatory than another if, other things being equal, one assumes less than another. According to
this measure, symbolists' rule-based explanation can be said to be less explanatory than connectionists'
association-based one, because the postulation oi rules is more assumptive than that of associations.
\,yhile associations are empirical objects explicitly definable as one of the properties of the neural
network, and ultimately of the brain, there is no empirical definition of what rules are, but an
implicit intuition of them. It seems to me quite doubtful whether the question can ever be answered.
without falling into a tautology. of what mles of language are, which is the very question that I
believe Rumelhart and McClelland (op. cit.) pose. Thus, the most crucial point in the debate is this:
It may be possible to define what are rules in terms of pattern association, but not vice versa, which
led Rume1hart and McClelland to make such eliminative claim expressed in (I). Accordingly, it is
not connectio~ists but symbolists who have the burden of proof in the debate, for what is really
alleged in the debate is, contrary to the distractive arguments of Pinker and Prince (op. cit.) and other
symbolists mentioned above, not the empirical adequacy of the alleged PDP model, but one truism
that has been unquestioned: the description of language in terms of rule can be identified with the
grammar, or the knowledge of language that symbolists simply have assumed to be internalized
somewhere in the brain somehow by virtue of the auxiliary construct called "competence" (Chomsky,
1965), of which there is no justification, and may be suffering from the "first order isomorphism
fallacy" (Kugler, Turvey and Shaw, 1982).
3. Revisiting the Past Tense Formation, Focusing on the Verbs Ending -in9 or -ink
In this section, I want to investigate one more aspect about the past tense formation that the
availability of rules is not sufficient for verbs to be inflected correctly, thereby basically arguing for a
connectionistic view on the ground that the fact could be explained by the competition among the
inflectional patterns available in that framework.
I will try to show that the grammatical formation is, at least in the case of verb inflection, no more
than the most acceptable formation, and the notion of grammaticality should be understood as strictly
a relative notion, because, for a verb to be correctly, i.e., grammatically, inflected, there must be
selection of one rule as the cO/7"ect olle. Accordingly, what is really explanatory in the case of verb
inflection is not the explanation of the fl,tJailability ofrules, which may be provided more easily in the
symbolist paradigm than the connectionist paradigm, but the explanation of the competition among
the rules available, which I doubt that symbolists have any seriously effort to account for, sheltering
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under the Chomskyan "competence" umbrella (Chomsky, 1965). I will address the brief discussion in
§4 to this most important problem.
3.1 Some Preliminaries
Rurnelhart-McClelland (op. cit.) modeled only a small portion of English speaker's performance:
the pattern association of the base and the past forms of English verbs. Symbolists criticize this
quantitative insufficiency of the alleged model as well. To make this kind of criticisms less relevant, I
want to extend the scope of description to the inflectional behavior of the triplet of forms, {base, past,
past participle}, of English verbs. Such extension, though, sets another kind oflimit, since it increases
complexity of the data to be handled. So, I will examine in this paper exclusively the inflectional
behavior of the English verbs that end either -ing or -ink, letting other irregular paradigms such as
{fiy,flew,flown}, [take, took, taken} out of scope.4 I believe, however, such limitation on coverage
will not harm essential points of the following arguments.
3.1.1 Definition of the Verb Inflection Scheme H-X
To make comparison between paradigms easier to handle, I will adopt the notational convention
of Verb Inflection Scheme (VIS) denoted by H-X, defined in the following lir;es for past and past
participle formation in English.
Consider, for example, two inflectional paradigms of sing and sink. The paradigm of sing can be
designated by the triplet (sing, sang, sung}, and that of sink by {sink, sank, sunk}, each consisting in
an array of three forms. Let H be a variable which stands for the header chunk of phonemes that is
maximally shared among the three forms (H = s- in this case). Thus, two inflectional paradigms
[sing, sang, sung} and (sink, sank, sunk} can be designated in simplified formats of H-(-ing, -ang,
-ling} and H-( -ink, -ank, - unk}, respectively. Let symbols such as At and A2 stand for reduced
arrays {-ing, -ang, -ung} and (-ink, -ank, -lllIk} , respectively. Thus. their paradigms are denoted in
simplified formats, H-A 1 and H-A2 (H = s-), respectively. Since Hin H-X is a variable ranging over
such sequences as S', st-, sfr-, and Xin I-l-X is a variable ranging over predefined symbols such as AI
= (-ing, -ang, -ung), A 2 = [-ink, -ank, -unk}, this convention facilitates exhaustive description of
certain portion of English verb inflection.
3.1.2 Description of Relevant Patterns
Among the inflections of English verbs that end either -ing or -ink, we can identify the following
four patterns. A, B, C and D, and their eight subpatterns as in (3), which exhaust all the inflectional
possibilities of those verbs so ending.
(]) Pattern A consists of the two subpatterns: H-Al' where AI = [-ing, -ang, -Illig}, and H-A2 ,
whereA2 = (-ink, -ank, -lllIk).
Pattern B consists of the two subpatterns: H-B 1, where BI = [-ing, -Illig, -Img}, and H-B2,
where B2 = {-ink, -lllIk, -Imk}.
Pattern C consists of the two subpatterns: H-C!, where C1 =(- ing, -ought, -ought}, and H-C2 ,
where C2 = (-ink, -ought, -ought).
Pattern D (regular) consists of the two subpatterns: H-Dl' where D1 = (-ing, -inged, -inged},
and H-D2 , where D2 ={-ink, -inked, -in.ked}
'For more detailed classification of past formation in English, see Bybee and Siobin (1982).
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The VIS defined above are useful not only for its economy in description but also for its
flexibility in extension. Although not purported in this paper, it is easy to incorporate into the VIS
other inflectional patterns of those verbs which end either -in or -im by enlarging its pattern index.
Thus, such paradigms as (beg-in, beg-an, beg-un] can be designated by H-A] (H = beg-; A] = (-in,
-an, -un)), for example, and (sw-im, sw-am, IW-lIm] by H-A4 (H =sw-;A4 = (-im, -am, -um)), each
of which is the generalization of the pattern H-A.
For each of the patterns that a VIS designates, symbolists postulate a rule. Given a rule of
English grammar that instructs us to "change internal vowel -i- to -a-" to form its past tense, its
application defines the same morphological object as that designated by pattern AI' Likewise,
another rule instructing to "change the internal vowel -i- to -11-" defines the same object as that
described by the pattern B2 • In short, the VIS introduced above denotes the same range ofmorphological
phenomena in different terms. What I intend here is. however, not to replace the rule-based
description with the scheme-based one, but to compare as fairly as possible the two claims by
symbolists and by connectionists by means ofan intermediate description language of VIS.
3.1.3 Universal Rule Scheme and the Notion of "Family of Rules"
It is rather trivial that both of past formation and past participle formation can be generalized in
terms of the scheme X~ X' / X = ... (call this Universal Rule Scheme (DRS)), in which we
interpret the left-hand part describes the association of given two forms, X and X', via a specified
rule r,. In other word, it describes what happens when the rule r, is applied to X. The right-hand
part describes the condition on the application of the rule Ii.
The past formations ofkick and sing require different rules; one is to "add -ed to V," and another
to "change internal vowel -i- to -a-." It is obvious that they are rules of a single rule of past
formation. Thus, past formation constitutes a family ofrules. Rules in the DRS are so indexed as to
indicate the identity within a specified family of rules. We say that a rule is available within DRS if,
and only if, there is a family of rules which contains the case. Consider this with the case of gerund
formation. It is preferable to say that the gerund formation also constitutes a family of rules, though
it consists of one and only one rule, "add -ing to the base," since we want to hold that the formations
of the past, the past participle and the gerund of verbs are grammatical phenomena of a same sort.
What is crucial to this point is that there must be an identity according to which phenomenologically
distinct rules are equally rules of a single rule. It is family of rules that determines such identity of a
word formation.
3.1.4 Notes on Past Participle Formation
The rule of past participle formation, "add suffix -en to the base," can also be formulated in terms
of the DRS. The rule alters take, for example, to tak-en, with truncation of ending vowel -e
involved. Note however that some verbs have two alternate past participle forms. For example, sink
alters either to Slink or sunk-en; drink alters either to drunk or drunk-en; and get alters either to got or
gott-en, where the - en suffixation has to do with only one of the two. Thus, past participle formation
is a composition of two distinct rules in one: one rule is to apply first to alter internal vowel in the
base, which is similar to the case of past formation; another is to apply secondly to add suffix -en to
the base already altered (including the case where there has been no vowel alternation).
3.2 Examination of Inflectional Paradigms by Means of Verb Inflection Schemes
In the examination that follows, I will try to demonstrate one thing, though indirectly: A
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symbolist theory of grammar that exclusively relies on "rules and representations" is not really explan-
atory, for, though it circumscribes what can happen in past or past participle formations, it does not
circumscribe what cannot happen in a significant sense. Specifically, rules-and-representations theory
is not a theory oflanguage strong enough to predict what is the past form of such imaginary verbs as
dring, whereas the PDP model would tell something about it. It is obvious that the word dring will
inflect, given it is a verb, according to one of the nIles available, but the theory would not tell which
rule is most likely to apply. In that theory, dring may inflect to form drang (like drink) or drought
(like bring), and, what is worse, there would be nothing that prevents it to inflect to form dre'"V.J (like
fly). Furthermore, it would not tell in an explanatory way why the verb dry does NOT inflect to form
drew despite the obvious phonological similarity with fly. In short, the rules-and-representations
theory is not really explanatory in that it would not provide any interesting account for the "prot0t)1)-
icality" in past and past participle formations, nor would it provide any direct account for the
"competition" among the paradigms available.
3.2.1 Case of sing-sink Pair
Let us begin our examination with the cases (4) and (s), where H = S-. When H = s- in H-X, the
following pattern of acceptabilities can be obtained:
(4) a. H· AI = (s-ing. s-allg, S-Ullg),
b. • H . B I = ·(s-ing. S-ul1g. S-lIllg) ,
c. * H· CI = *(s-ing, s-ollght, s-ought),
d. • H· D1 = "{s-ing. s-illged, s-inged}
(s) a. H· A1 =(s-illk. s-allk. s-ulIk),
b. * H· B2 = *(s-ink. 5-11111<., s-lIl1k),
c. * H· C1 = *(s-ink, s-ought, s-ougbt),
d. " H· D1 =*(s-illk. s-inked, s-inked}
where the symbol * attached to the paradigm is to indicate that it is unacceptable as the inflectional
paradigm of the word in the lexical system of standard English.
The possibility of inflection above shows that patterns except for AI and A2 are all unacceptable
ifH = s- in that there are distinct two and only nvo verbs so inflected.
As the comparison with s-(-eek, -ought, -ought} makes clear, any !\VO verbs inflecting in H-C lose
lexical distinctions both in past and past participle forms. I suspect that this factor makes H-C the
least available.
3.2.2 Case of sling-slink Pair
When H = sl- in H-X, then the following pattern of acceptabilities will result:
(6) a. " H· AI = *(I/-jng, sl-ang, sl-ulIg)
b. H· B1 = (sl-ing, sl-ung, sl-ung)
c. " H· CI =*{sl-ing, sl-ought, sl-ought}
d. * H· D, = *(sl-jng, sl-illged, sl-illged)
C;j) a. * H . A}. = *{sl-ink, sl-ank, sl-unk}
22 K. Kuroda: Ontological Commitment to "Rules"
b. H· B2 = {51-ink, sl-lInk, sl-lInk}
c. • H· C2 = ·{sl-ink. sl-ollght. sl-ollght}
d. • H· D 2 = '{sl-ink, sl-inked. sl-inked}.
The distribution of acceptabilities indicates that. ifH =51-. the scheme H-B is valid in both cases
of II-ing (index I) and H-ink (index 2). Compare this pattern of acceptabilities with that of
sing-sing pair in §J.2.1, where the scheme A is selected for X in H-X irrespective of their difference
in pattern index. In this case. the same symbol B is selected for X of H-X, irrespective of the value of
H in I-/-x. We find there a weak tendency of invariance in the selection of scheme. which can be
observed also in the cases to be examined.
3.2.3 Case of sting-stink Pair: Identification of the "Superpattern"
\Vhen H =st- in I-/-x. then the following pattern of acceptabilities will be obtained:
(8) a. • H· Al = '{st-ing, st-ang. st-lIng}
b. H· 8 1 = {st-ing. st-ung. st-lIng}
c. • H· CI =•{st-ing. st-ought, st-ought}
d. • H· D 1 = '{st-ing, st-inged, st-inged}
(9) a. If· Al ={.rt-ink. st-ank, st-unk}
b. If· 8 2 = [st-ink, st-lInk, st-lInk}
c. * H . C2 = ·{st-ink. st-ought. st-ought}
d. • H· D 2 =*[ st-ink. st-inked, st-inked}
The distribution of acceptabilities indicates that, ifII = st-, rule application is ambiguous, for two
patterns II-A and H-B are both correct with respect to the inflection of stink. This means that there
is less need to distinguish between patterns !i-A and H-B. The paradigm of shrink show this kind of
ambiguity. too. For comparison, verbs which solely obey pattern A count: ring, drink, spring. sing.
and sink. whereas those which solely obey pattern B count hang. cling. fling, sling, string, wring, and
sting. Viewing such ambiguity, it is probably insignificant to distinguish exactly availabilities of
patterns H-A and H-B. since, even if it is ever successful, it win generalize little. I would rather
think that two patterns !i-A and H-B are not utterly distinct. but form a superpattern.
3.2.4 Cases of ring- rink and wring -?wrink Pairs: Inflectional Differentiation
When H = r- in ll-X, then the following pattern of acceptabilities will result:
(10) a. H· AI = {r-ing. r-ang. r-ung}
b. • H· B. ='{ r-ing, r-ling. r-ung}
c. • H· CI = *{ r-ing, r-ollght, r-ollght}
d. • H· D , = ·{r-ing, r-inged, r-inged}.
(n) a. *H· A2 = *{ r-ink. r-ank, r-unk}
b. * H . B2 = *{ r-ink, r-Imk. r-ll1Ik}
c. • H· C2 ='{ I'-ink. r-ought, r-ought}
d. H· D2 = {I'-ink, r-inked, r-illked}
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The distribution indicates that the invariance in the selection ofXin H-X does not hold; but it is
rather because the word rink is not a verb in the lexicon of standard English. So, it will not be false
to predict that rink would have inflected as in H-A2 if the word was a verb.
Although such irregularity may be accidental, it is still worth of some considerations. Consider
the fact that such irregularity tends to occur in cases of unvoiced consonant -ink. Given the minimal
phonological opposition between H-ing and H-ink, it is the latter case that tends to be a noun. The
tendency exists. I presume. not only because of phonological reasons, but of semantic, or, more
explicitly, conceptual ones (e.g., different sound symbolisms in -g and -k), as Bybee (1985, 1994)
typically claims.
Furthermore, when f{ = wr-, then the following patterns of acceptability will be obtained:
02) a. *H· AI = *( wr-ing, wr-ang, wr-ung)
b. H· B, = (wr-ing, wr-ung. wr-ung)
c. *H . C1 = *(wr-ing, wr-ought, wr-ought)
d. *H· D I = *(wr-ing, wr-inged, wr-inged)
(13) a. ? H· A2 = ?(wr-ink, wr-ank, wr-unk)
b. ?H· B2 = ?(wr-ink, wr-unk, wr-unk)
c. ? H· C2 = ?(wr-ink, wr-ought. wr-ought]
d. ?H· D 2 = ?(wr-ink, wr-inked. wr-inked}.
where the symbol? is to designate the uncertainty of inflection. It is necessary because the lexicon of
standard English does not contain the word wrink which forms a minimal phonological pair with
rink. Thus, (13) is an imaginary paradigm. But I believe that it is still possible to predict what can
happen if English has the word in the lexicon. If wrink is not a verb, the word will unambiguously
inflect in H-D2, and, otherwise, it is most likely that the word inflects as in H-B2 keeping the
contrast with H-B1; with H-B1 less likely, and H-C2 the least likely. It can be so predicted if we
assume that the lexicon oflanguage has a tendency to be well organized with respect to the differentiation
of a superpattem mentioned above.
What deserves mention here is the fact that ring in (II) and wring in (12) inflect differently,
though they pronounce the same. I suspect that there is another principle in organizing the lexicon
for making the two paradigms as distinct as possible.
3.2.5 Case of ?dring-drinkPair
When H = dr-, then the following patterns can be obtained, though (14) is imaginary:
(4) a. ?H· ~ = ?{dr-ing, dr-ang, dr-ung]
b. ?H . B] = ?{dr-ing, dr-ung, dr-ung]
c. ?H . C1 = ?(dr-ing, dr-ought, dr-ought)
d. ?H . D1 = ?(dr-ing, dr-inged, dr-inged)
(IS) a. H· A2 = (dr-ink, dr-ank, dr-unk)
b. *H· B2 = *(dr-ink, dr-unk, dr-unk)
c. *H . C2 = *(dr-ink, dr-ought, dr-ought)
d. *H· D 2 = ·(dr-ink, dr-inked, dr-inked}.
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As well as the case of wnnk in (13), the lexicon of standard English does not contain the word dring,
but it is nevertheless possible to predict that if it is a noun the imaginary word will inflect as in (I4d),
and otherwise. it will inflect as either in (14a, b, c). I suspect that it is most likely that dring inflects
as in (14a) if the contrast between (I~) and (lsa) can be maximized, but its phonological similarity to
bring may make it inflect as in (I4c), which I will discuss in §3.2.6.
Although there seems to be a tendency that for each pairs of the two words that end -ing and
-ink, that which ends -ing is more likely to be a verb, the existing verb in this case is unvoiced, -ink
ending one. Of all the pairs of irregular verbs which form minimal contrasts between H-ing/ H-ink,
apparent exceptions are only the following three pairs; *dring/drink, ·shring/shrink and *thing/think.
Compare them with other pairs: hang/*hanh., fling/*jlink, cling/*clink, sling/*slink, ring/*rink,
bringrbrink, springl*sprink, stringl*strink, wringrwrink, swingl*swink.
3.2.6 Case of bring- brink Pair: Disturbing Inflection I
When H = br-, then the following pattern ofacceptabilities can be obtained:
(16) a. * H· AI =*(br-ing, br-ang, br-ung)
b. • H· B, =*(br-ing, br-ung, br-ung)
c. H· C, = (br-ing, br-ought. br-ought)
d. • H· D, =*(br-ing. br-inged, br-inged}
(17) a. • H· A2 = ·(br-ink, br-ank, br-unk)
b. • H· B2 = ·(br-ink, br-unk, br-unk)
c. *H· C2 =.(br-ink, br-ought, br-ought)
d. H· D2 = (br-ink, br-inked, br-inked)
The word brink is a noun in the lexicon of standard English, and its inflection scheme is H-D.
As the comparison with the pair of ring and rink in §P.4 makes clear, it is quite unpredictable that
bring inflect as in H-C1• The crucial point is, I think, the learnability of the scheme H-G.
Historical factors may have helped to the particularity of this pattern, but it is quite implausible
to assume that the child has a certain potential to access to such factors. Keeping the pattern H-C
being distinct from other patterns must cost a lot, since of all the verbs that end either -ing or ink,
only bring and think (to be discussed §3.2.7) exhibit this pattern (and seek with some extension in
pattern index). Given the pattern C is marked, I doubt that the degree of markedness can be stated
in rules and representations theories.
3.2.7 Case of thing- think Pair: Disturbing Case II
When H = th-, then the following pattern ofacceptabilities can be obtained:
(18) a. • H· AI = *(th-ing, th-ang, th-ung)
b. * H· B. = ·(th-ing, th-ung, th-ung)
c. • H· C, = *(th-ing, th-ought, th-ought}
d. H· D, = (th-ing, th-inged, th-inged)
(19) a. • H· A2 = *(th-ink, th-ank, th-unk)
b. * H· B2 = ·(th-ink, th-unk, th-unk)
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c. H· C2 " (th-ink, th-ought, th-ought)
d. * H· D 2 " *(th-ink, th-inked, th-inked)
As noted earlier, inflections in pattern C does not preserve lexical distinction between -ing and
-ink in past and past participle forms. To put differently, the patter C is not suitable for the verbs
that may have lexical distinction between -g and -k. Consider the paradigms of those verbs that have
not such negative possibility such as fight. It inflect as {ftght,fought,fought} without the possibility
of losing its distinction from the word "jighd /fayd/, which is not a possible word in English. I
suspect that this is the strongest reason that the pattern C is the least available in the class of
inflectional paradigm that has been considered.
3.3 "Chaos" in the Mind: Summary of the Section
It seems quite claimable to me - though wanting for appropriate neuro-biological foundation -
that such paradigms as (hring, hrang, hnmg) are incorrect in standard English not because, as
symbolists such as Chomsky and Halle (1967) postulate, of deterministic factors, but because, as
cognitivists such as Bybee (1985.1994), Lakoff(1982, 1987), and Langacker (1988) postulate, ofexperiential
factors. The stability of the English lexicon is admittedly not so secure, and somehow retained
mostly by chances, thereby exhibiting a "chaotic" behavior.
Note that, by the term "chaos," I do not mean that verb inflection constitutes just a disorder
making no regularity, though various versions of such view have been frequently stated and quite
popular in linguistics. I mean that the contrary should be tme. As Bybee and Slobin (1982)
demonstrated, there are dasses of regularity, whicll in itself calls attention and demands explanation.
It is certain that the frequency in usage plays there a crucial role. as Bybee (1985) claims, but with
its appropriate interpretation accompanied. Given that language is an "open system," and so is verb
inflection. Frequency in usage thus can be interpreted as the "temperature" of the system, and,
according to Prigogine and Stengers (1984), there emerges a chaos, or something that is difficult to
predict the exact behavior of, in such an open system whose temperature is not too cold, nor too hot.
Such characterization of the issue is admittedly a sketchy metaphor, and it is by itself problematic.
However, according to recent important findings in natural sciences (Gleick, 1987), chaotic phenomena
are so common that non-chaotic phenomena are rare and even exceptional. If so, why does not the
language have chaotic properties? We can nowadays expect such hardly predictable phenomena to
fall within what Nicolis and Prigogine (1989) call "problems of complexity." Such line of exploration
oflinguistic phenomena will come with successful results in future, and, indeed, PDP modelings of
linguistic phenomena have been already guided on such line. So, I think that some of symbolists'
rejections to connectionist models rely on certain scientific ignorance.
4. Discussion: Reconciling the Debate in a Realistic Way
Advocates ofsymbol manipulation paradigm follow classical ontological argument. They ostensibly
argue that there must be rules of language because most of linguistic phenomena can be described in
terms of rule. Such argument can be easily invalidated, however: it is because it is not true that there
are rules for all that can be described in terms of rule. Thus, the fundamental issue raised in the
symbolist-connectionist debate can be simplified as this: VVhy is it possihle to describe systematically
most of linguistic phenomena such as past or past participle formations in terms of rule? This
renewal of question, which I think serves to make clear the most crucial problem in the debate,
inevitably forces us to seek for answers to those more fundamental problems of what is a description,
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what is a reality, etc. Although it is doubtful there arc any answers to the questions, I want to
suggest in the following discussion a plausible direction that linguists should take, which seems to
reconcile the debate in a realistic way.
4.1 Nature of Linguistic Description
To begin with, I want to make conceptually clear what linguists actually do when they think that
they do linguistics is a phenomenology ofthe language, comparing it with what chemists do when they
think that they do chemistry.
In the case ofverb inflection, linguists can be said to do linguistics when they make generalizations
from the description of a kind of natural phenomena occurring in the speaker's mind, which will




X I,EF )j,.(X)IX= ...
j(X) giEG)X;
where (i) X stands for a given resource (e.g., the base form of a verb), (ii) fi E F stands for a format
of operation specified by the condition ... / X = ... among the available formats within the functional
identity F (e.g., past tense formation), (iii) g; EGis the mental association of the two mental
entities, f(X) and X;. Linguists can say that there is a mle if they can formulate a scheme like
(20).
On larger scales, the scheme (zo) and, therefore, the system of mles work fairly effectively. But,
rules or schemes function only as heuristic devices, for their validity is essentially trivial, because they
are powerful enough to describe anything that is describable.
Note that the validity of such heuristic devices tells nothing about the facts on smaller scales. i.e.,
architecture of the mind. On smaller scales, on the contrary, as Rumelhart and McClelland (1986)
suggests, an appropriate model exposed to an appropriate data (i.e., consistent and sufficient amount
of the pairs of V and W) manifests the property of automatic abstraction, and the availability of
formats emerges automatically. Thus, the model suggests that human brain's learning potential
dispenses the hypothesis of the innateness of linguistic knowledge. In short, what connectionists
attack is the dogma of isomorphism according to which symbolists postulate that what is described
on larger scales in terms of rules, schemes, or patterns is isomorphic to what actually occurs on
smaller scales of the mind.
The following are my specific proposals to blur the symbolist-connectionist debate.
(zr) a. The assumption of system of rules as instantiation of the innate knowledge oflanguage is
less explanatory than the assumption of human brain's innate ability to perform such
automatic abstractions as V~ fi(V)---1i..-.:, V; in (zo).
b. Given that (a) is correct, it will be simpler, and is probably better, to consider "rules of
language," at least for the case ofverb inflection, to be phenomenological entities.
By stating like (zra), I do not intend to claim that mles are not indispensable for linguistics. The
contrary is tme. Rules are indispensable to achieve certain explanations in linguistics out ofdescriptions.
But I also bear in mind that what is an explanation in linguistics is not an explanation in ultimate
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form, for explanations in linguistics arc on phenomenological scales.
4.2 linguistics as a Phenomenology of the Language
I guess that fanatic proponents of symbol manipulation paradigm may attack my statement that
linguistics is a phenomenology of the language, but I believe that they attack it simply because they
do not really understand what is meant by the term "phenomenology." Most natural sciences are
phenomenologies: biology is a phenomenology of the nature in terms of"life ," chemistry is a phenom-
enology of the nature in terms of "reactions," and even most part of physics is a phenomenology of
the nature in term of "motion."
What strikes me the most in the generativist-connectionist debate is, as well as its ideological
aspects, symbolists' over-defensive conception of what is and should be linguistics. It is quite certain,
from various historical facts we have, that, in every field ofscience, there are possibilities of eliminative
reduction. Here is an example, and we can learn a lesson from it.
Consider conceptual conflicts between chemistry and physics. Suppose that all elements (primitives
in chemistry) are proved to be composed of lower-level entities (e.g., nucleons), and nucleons of
further lower-level entities (e.g., quarks). Even if this happened, it would be very unlikely that a
branch of science that we now call chemistry then disappear. Imagine a situation in which no one
can talk about the nature in terms of chemical reactions, which is not only quite inconvenient but
also absurd. This means that it is necessary to relax the notion of reality not to exclude the possibility
of talking about elements as if they were real. I say so because I believe that the nature will, like a
well that never goes dry, continue to nourish our scientific knowledge even on phenomenological
scales. Recent discovery of "chaotic" aspects of the nature, which happened to fall within biology and
chemistry, is a good example of this (Gleick, 1987). The discovery seems to confirm one ironical fact:
the more familiar is a phenomenon, the worse understood it is likely to be. In any event, thanks to
essential richness of the "superficial" facts, modern chemistry can be content with the status of a
phenomenological science; and, unlike some parts of modern physics aiming to seek out ultimate
entities of the natme, there is few motivations for chemists to investigate things deeper and deeper.
Replace the nature for chemists and physicians with the langllage for linguists and connectionists,
and think again the debate. Then consider again the claim (I) by Rumelhart and McClelland. It
does not really matter, J believe, whether to talk about the language in terms of rule (higher-level
entity), or in terms of association (lower-level entity) if we have acknowledged that linguistics is a
phenomenology of the language. It is quite easy to run into one of the extreme positions of radical
symbolist and connectionist, but it would not be very wise. Linguistics does not need to be so strict a
science of the language as brain science does, like chemistry does not need to be so strict a science of
the nature as quantum mechanics docs. I believe that it will be the most reasonable way to give a
reply of why not to Rumelhart and McClelland's challenge, and continue our looser talks about the
language in terms of rule, scheme, pattern, class, and the like, but without any ontological commitment
to them.
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